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Abstract
How does labour market disadvantage translate into political behaviour? Bring-
ing together the literatures on political alienation, redistribution preferences and
insider-outsider politics, we identify three mechanisms by which labour market
disadvantages inﬂuence voting behaviour. Disadvantages can increase support
for redistribution, reduce internal political efﬁcacy or lower external political efﬁcacy.
This translates into support for pro-redistribution parties, vote abstention or support
for protest parties. Using the Dutch LISS survey, we observe a twin effect of increased
support for redistribution and decreased external efﬁcacy. Mediated through redistribu-
tive preferences, we ﬁnd a positive effect of labour market disadvantage on voting for
left parties.Mediated through external efﬁcacywe ﬁnd a positive effect of labourmarket
disadvantage on protest voting. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd any effect of labour market
disadvantage on internal efﬁcacy. Hence, the observed effect of labour market disad-
vantage on political abstention is entirely mediated by external efﬁcacy.
Key words: political behaviour, labour market disadvantage, political efﬁcacy, redistribution,
elections, protest voting
JEL classiﬁcations: D72, J24, J64
1. Introduction
How do negative experiences in the labour market affect individuals’ political behaviour? This
question has received considerable attention in social science research. With some simpliﬁcation,
one can identify three research traditions dealing with it. First, there are studies (some of them
classics) analysing whether the experience of labourmarket disadvantage, such as unemployment
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or economic insecurity, affect political alienation (Jahoda et al., 1972; Schlozman and Verba,
1979; Rosenstone, 1982; Verba et al., 1995). These studies emphasise sociological and psycho-
logical mechanisms linking labour market experiences to political involvement.
Second, political economists typically disregard effects on citizens’ involvement, but
analyse whether and how labour market disadvantage affects support for redistribution,
social protection and left parties (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm,
2009). The underlying theory emphasises economically instrumental motives and how they
are determined by individuals’ position in the labour market.
Within political economy, one can further distinguish insider-outsider theory as a third ap-
proach (Saint-Paul, 1996; Lindbeck and Snower, 2001), which turns the standard expectation
of how labour market disadvantage affects voting behaviour upside down. It adds the notion
that the post-industrial working class is characterised by political conﬂict between privileged
and disadvantaged workers and that traditional left parties side with the former. The disad-
vantaged outsiders then realign with other parties or simply abstain from participating
(Rueda, 2005; Lindvall and Rueda, 2014).
How do these different theoretical perspectives relate to each other? To date there is sur-
prisingly little dialogue between them. This is unfortunate because they focus on different con-
sequences of labour market disadvantage, which are likely to jointly affect political behaviour.
Depending on the context and type of political behaviour one is interested in, alienation from
politics and economic interests may reinforce each other or cancel each other out. Hence, re-
searchers risk making erroneous inferences if the causal link connecting labour market disad-
vantage and political behaviour is not carefully modelled. Only empirical analyses taking
into account both alienation and instrumental voting are able to capture the effect of
labour market disadvantage on voting behaviour.
Speciﬁcally, we argue that whilst some voters repeatedly exposed to labour market disad-
vantage develop tendencies to support redistribution, others, at the same time, feel less polit-
ically efﬁcacious. Using the classic distinction between internal and external political efﬁcacy
(Lane, 1959; Balch, 1974; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993), we formulate three hypotheses
about how labour market disadvantage inﬂuences voting behaviour. First, labour market dis-
advantage can depress individuals’ self-perceived competence to inﬂuence politics (low intern-
al efﬁcacy), which is likely to lead to abstention from voting. Second, labour market
disadvantage can inﬂuence individuals’ perception of the extent to which the political
system, in particular the mainstream parties, are responsive to their personal interests (low ex-
ternal efﬁcacy), which is likely to lead to increased protest voting or abstention from voting.
Finally, following the political economy literature, we hypothesise that labour market disad-
vantage inﬂuences individuals’ economic interests and is thus likely to lead to increased
support for pro-redistribution parties.
Considering multiple mechanisms mediating between labour market disadvantage and pol-
itical behaviour helps theorising party preferences more precisely. Whereas preferences for redis-
tribution and low efﬁcacy pull voters in different directions with regards to some parties (typically
the radical right and themainstream left), bothmechanisms reinforce each other in the case of the
radical left, which combines the possibility to protest and to support the welfare state. Hence, the
main contribution of this article is providing a novel and more encompassing framework for
studying how experiences of labour market disadvantage affect political behaviour.
A second contribution of the article is conceptual. Most empirical approaches conceptualise
labour market disadvantage by focusing on a single dimension, such as risk, income or
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employment status. However, post-industrial labour markets are increasingly characterised by
various forms of labourmarket disadvantage between which individuals oscillate, such as invol-
untary part-time, temporary employment or in-work poverty (Emmenegger et al., 2012).
Moreover, the existing literature typically relies on cross-sectional measures of labour market
disadvantage. Given the resilience of some dimensions of political behaviour (Prior, 2010), it
is, however, doubtful whether such a ‘snapshot’ operationalisation is suitable to capture the
effects of labour market experiences (Margalit, 2013). We overcome both shortcomings of
the existing literature by using a composite indicator of labour market disadvantage, which in-
cludes different forms of disadvantage as well as longitudinal information on the individual
level.
We analyse our argument using micro-level data from the Netherlands. It is a perfect test
case to go beyond broad left-right distinctions because the Dutch labour market is charac-
terised by various forms of labour market disadvantage and because its multi-party system
offers voters remarkable variety in terms of ideological placement. In the Dutch context, we
do observe a twin effect of increased support for redistribution and decreased external efﬁcacy.
In a mediation analysis we ﬁnd signiﬁcant indirect effects of labour market disadvantage on
vote choice.Mediated through redistributive preferences, we ﬁnd a positive effect on voting for
left political parties (Greens, Labour and Socialists). Mediated through external efﬁcacy we
ﬁnd a positive effect on protest behaviour (voting for the Socialists and the radical right
Freedom Party as well as political abstention). The interplay of both mechanisms explains
why the (direct) effect of labour market disadvantage is strongest for voting for the Dutch
Socialist Party. In contrast, we do not ﬁnd any effect of labour market disadvantage on intern-
al efﬁcacy. Hence, the observed effect of labour market disadvantage on political abstention is
entirely mediated by external efﬁcacy.
2. Labour market disadvantage and political behaviour: alienation or
economic interests?
How exactly are experiences of labour market disadvantage and political behaviour con-
nected? In the literature, we ﬁnd three more or less disparate answers.
First, it has been argued that labour market disadvantage leads to phenomena such as with-
drawal from political participation, radicalisation or political distrust. We label this research
tradition, which can be traced back to theMarienthal study (Jahoda et al., 1972), the alienation
literature. It has traditionally focussed on unemployment as a form of disadvantage that de-
prives citizens of work-related skills and resources that foster political inclusion (Rosenstone,
1982; Verba et al., 1995; Schur, 2003). A problem with such resource-based arguments is
that they are based on theories of employment and its relevance for participation; mechanisms
linking disadvantage to participation remain theoretically under-developed (but we try to spell
them out in the next section). Recent contributions have included non-standard employment as
additional forms of disadvantage and pointed to party agency as the driving force of alienation
(King and Rueda, 2008; Standing, 2011)—an argument to which we return later.
Second, political economy postulates that labour market disadvantage strengthens support
for redistribution and left parties. Economically instrumental voters respond to disadvantage
by voting for parties maximizing redistribution and social protection, that is, the left (Hibbs,
1977; Korpi, 1983; Cusack et al., 2006). That risk, income and unemployment inﬂuence pol-
itical preferences along these lines has been repeatedly conﬁrmed (e.g. Rehm, 2009; Margalit,
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2013). However, political economy is often criticised for omitting non-economic motives
(Fong, 2001; Bechtel et al., 2014), and indeed it has mostly neglected mechanisms by
which labour market disadvantage may lead to political alienation rather than to pragmatic
policy choices. In fact, arguments about limited resources and frustration are difﬁcult to rec-
oncile with assumptions of sophistication and instrumentality.
Adding further complexity, a third approach on disadvantage exists within political
economy. Insider-outsider theory adds to standard political economy by insisting that
labour market disadvantage is distributed discontinuously. Discontinuities result from
labour market institutions, in particular ﬁring costs, hampering mobility prospects of un-
employed and non-standard workers (Saint-Paul, 1996; Rueda, 2005). Insider-outsider
theory turns the political economy argument on its head: instead of voting for the left
(which is supportive of mobility barriers), the disadvantaged turn towards right parties
(which support deregulation of mobility barriers), towards the radical left (which promises
expanding insider privileges to outsiders) or the extreme right (which allows expressing dis-
content) (Lindvall and Rueda, 2014, p. 462).
By asking which workers are really represented by left parties, insider-outsider theory chal-
lenges the simple link between disadvantage and voting left. Furthermore, bringing represen-
tation and party behaviour into the picture has raised awareness amongst scholars that
disadvantaged workers may withdraw from politics or radicalise (Rueda, 2005; King and
Rueda, 2008; Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Marx, 2014). However, so far insider-
outsider theory has not provided an explicit theoretical argument of how rational responses
to labour market disadvantage and risk of alienation are related to each other. It also remains
unclear how alienation from mainstream parties is manifested in political behaviour.
To conclude, theories linking political behaviour to labour market disadvantage focus
either on instrumental choices of policies and parties or alienation from (mainstream) politics.
Insider-outsider theory has afﬁnities to both perspectives, but fails to provide coherent theor-
etical predictions of political behaviour. Empirical research indicates that both instrumental
and alienation arguments have at least some explanatory power. Hence, there is no a priori
reason why instrumental motives and political alienation should not jointly affect political be-
haviour. In the following, we propose a framework integrating both perspectives.
3. The framework: the effect of labour market disadvantage
on voting behaviour
The literature review has shown that we are confronted with a multitude of plausible but em-
pirically under-explored causal channels whose relations to each other are unclear. Given our
lack of empirical knowledge, we think it would be premature to formulate a uniﬁed theory of
labour market disadvantage and voting at this stage. What we propose instead is a framework
that allows integrating diverse perspectives and deriving testable predictions in a given political
context. We develop such a framework in two steps by linking disadvantage ﬁrst to turnout and
second to vote choice. Before we do so, we brieﬂy clarify our understanding of disadvantage.
3.1 What is labour market disadvantage?
Disadvantage comprises concepts such as employment precariousness, outsiderness, insecur-
ity, in-work poverty and so on. It covers situations such as having no or only insecure employ-
ment, being underemployed due to involuntary part-time or earning a low wage. We do not
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claim that these forms yield identical political behaviour effects. But from a psychological and
epidemiological perspective, they have in common that they trigger (worries about future) ma-
terial and social deprivation and hence function as powerful stressors. This has been shown
for job insecurity (Sverke et al., 2002), unemployment (Paul andMoser, 2009) and precarious
employment (Benach et al., 2014).
Existing political behaviour studies on disadvantage, however, have ignored that negative
effects can accumulate if workers oscillate between different forms of disadvantage.
Epidemiological research has recognised the importance of the question whether ‘the toxic
effects of precariousness are cumulative over time’ (Benach et al., 2014, p. 243). We think
this is equally important for political behaviour because persistence greatly exacerbates the
impact of disadvantage(s) on individuals’ lives and therefore ampliﬁes the mechanisms dis-
cussed below. What follows from this is that disadvantage should be conceptualised as multi-
faceted phenomenon unfolding over time. This is to distinguish it from isolated and transient
job-related problems.
3.2 Labour market disadvantage and turnout
Political economy makes various predictions about vote choice of the disadvantaged; the
alienation perspective casts doubt onwhether they turn out in the ﬁrst place.What is themech-
anism connecting disadvantage to turnout? Consider this simple voting model (to be found in
Krosnick et al., 2010) where likelihood of voting is a function of:
ðmotivation to voteÞ × ðability to voteÞ × ð1 difficulty of votingÞ
The model does not include economic beneﬁts of voting, which are zero given vanishingly low
chances of affecting election outcomes. Difﬁculty refers to the convenience of voting proce-
dures, which are exogenous to the labour market situation (and hence irrelevant for us).
Motivation and ability, however, could be affected by disadvantage.
To argue why, we propose replacing the abstract concept of alienation with the more con-
crete concept of (low) political efﬁcacy. Efﬁcacy comprises internal and external political
efﬁcacy (Lane, 1959; Balch, 1974). Internal efﬁcacy means subjective ability to make mean-
ingful political decisions. External efﬁcacy means subjective responsiveness of political elites
to citizens’ demands. Both forms are strong predictors of turnout (Acock et al., 1985;
Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Ulbig and Funk, 1999). Both could be depressed by labour
market disadvantage.
Regarding internal efﬁcacy, one mechanism is based on the spill-over model linking work
experiences with political participation (Pateman, 1970; Sobel, 1993; Adman, 2008).
Accordingly, if frustrating job experiences lower workers’ self-esteem and sense of self-
mastery, this can spill over into subjective beliefs about political competences (Greenberg
et al., 1996; Schur, 2003). Put simply, feeling like a failure in the labour market may lead
to feelings of incompetence with regards to politics. Note that low internal efﬁcacy is
similar but not identical with the lack of civic skills conjectured by Verba et al. (1995).
In a similar vein, we think that Rosenstone’s (1982) resource argument can be substan-
tiated by relating it to internal efﬁcacy. Being absorbed by job-related concerns may prevent
individuals experiencing labour market disadvantages from investing time and cognitive re-
sources into acquiring the necessary information to feel internally efﬁcacious. The intuition
here is that the unemployed and insecure rather study vacancy notices in newspapers than
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the politics section. The upshot of both mechanisms (spill-over and limited resources) is that
disadvantage translates into lower (subjective or objective) ability to vote, one of the variables
in the voting model cited above.
Regarding motivation to vote, the second relevant variable, we argue that disadvantage
has a depressing effect through low external efﬁcacy. This is in line with the representation
argument of insider-outsider theory (Rueda, 2005). Case studies corroborate that workers
suffering labour market disadvantage are poorly represented in the political arena (Palier
and Thelen, 2010; Davidsson and Emmenegger, 2012; Hassel, 2014). From the perspective
of a disadvantaged voter this means that political parties are (a) too similar to each other
and (b) too far away from her preferred policy. In such a situation, turnout becomes less
likely (Plane and Gershtenson, 2004; Adams et al., 2006). Because vote choice becomes mean-
ingless, motivation to vote decreases.
Note that the external efﬁcacy argument mashes up claims about individual motivation and
party systems. Depending on the party system, the argument can be turned around. If there is a
party that represents the interests of the disadvantaged, external efﬁcacy and motivation to vote
should increase. If some parties agitate against unresponsive political elites, which is a deﬁning
feature of populism, disadvantaged voters may be extra motivated to vote and to express their
annoyance. Although we cannot test the party system argument in this article, it should be kept
in mind given the populist turn European party systems have taken in recent years (Kriesi,
2014).1What is important here is that disadvantaged voters are motivated not only bymaximis-
ing economic beneﬁts but also by the psychological gratiﬁcation from ‘punishing’ mainstream
parties. This leads us to the next step in our argument: vote choice.
3.3 Labour market disadvantage and vote choice
If the disadvantaged do vote (which we assume for a moment), political economy predicts a ten-
dency towards left parties. The underlying reasoning is based on the spatial voting model and
assumed proximity in demanded and supplied levels of redistribution (e.g. Cusack et al., 2006).
We agree with the broad prediction, even if we remain agnostic with regards to assumptions of
sophistication and economic self-interest maximisation. What we refer to as labour market
disadvantage is a set of economic constraints and risks that are very tangible for affected
individuals. Therefore, disadvantage increases the personal importance voters attach to
socio-economic issues (Marx, 2015). Even if voters do not possess sophisticated knowledge
of parties’ exact position, most of them arguably have more than a rough idea where parties
stand historically and currently on salient issues such as welfare and redistribution. Hence,
we simply expect that disadvantaged voters have a strong personal interest in redistribution
(which will be reﬂected in their vote choice) and some knowledge about which parties can be
expected to cater it.
As mentioned already, supporting redistribution is not the only motivation for disadvan-
taged voters. They can also be motivated by the desire to express resentment with political
elites and one way to do so is voting for populist or anti-system parties. This motive can be
purely expressive, that is, voting against the system is psychologically rewarding in itself. It can
also be instrumental, for instance, with the goal of incentivising more responsiveness of main-
stream parties in the future (Kedar, 2005; Kselman and Niou, 2011). Whether expressively or
1 The comparative argument would bet that the disadvantaged are more likely to abstain in party
systems in which there is a limited ideological choice.
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instrumentally motivated, the important point for us is that if labour market disadvantage
leads to low external efﬁcacy, as we argue based on the insider-outsider literature, protest
parties become an alternative for disadvantaged voters.
3.4 Bringing it all together
In sum, we identify three mediators linking labourmarket disadvantage to political behaviour:
internal efﬁcacy, external efﬁcacy and redistribution preferences (see Figure 1). If low internal
efﬁcacy dominates, we expect a higher propensity to abstain. In this case, disadvantaged
(non-)voters become politically apathetic. If redistribution preferences dominate, we expect
a higher propensity to vote left and no effect on abstention. The more complicated case is
low external efﬁcacy. Depending on the party system, it may lead to higher abstention (if
there are no protest parties) or to protest voting (if there are such parties).
Low internal efﬁcacy is a relatively distinctmechanism, because apathy probably does not even
let clear policy preferences and normative assessments of parties develop. Low external efﬁcacy
and redistribution preferences, however, are likely to affect political behaviour simultaneously
(this joint mediation is represented by the shaded area in Figure 1).2 As elaborated before, low
external efﬁcacy theoretically results frommainstream parties’ unresponsiveness to disadvantaged
voters’ interests. What does that mean for vote choice? The straightforward answer is that in the
(likely) case that disadvantage is jointly mediated by external efﬁcacy and redistribution prefer-
ences, the disadvantagedwill choose parties that combine a protest with a redistribution platform.
Voting for a mainstream left party, such as the Social Democrats, only allows supporting
redistribution, not expressing protest. Voting radical right-wing parties only allows expressing
Figure 1 Overview on possible mediation relationships.
Notes: The grey box accounts for the possibility that protest vote and left vote overlap, such as in a vote
for an extreme left party.
2 The mediators could exist simultaneously in the group of the disadvantaged, so that some disadvan-
taged suffer low efﬁcacy whereas others primarily demand redistribution. They could also co-exist on
the individual level and hence simultaneously affect individuals’ decision making. We cannot empir-
ically distinguish between these two possibilities because in both cases the two mediators jointly
affect the average effect of labour market disadvantage on political behaviour.
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protest but typically not maximising redistributive social spending. In both cases low efﬁcacy
and redistribution preferences cancel each other out. However, they reinforce each other, for
instance, in the case for radical left-wing parties, which combine an anti-establishment platform
with maximum support for the welfare state. More generally, our framework implies that we
should only expect unambiguous positive effects of labour market disadvantage on voting for
parties which can mobilise potentially alienated voters and at the same time support redistribu-
tive policies (which could also be a radical right party adopting welfare chauvinism).
To sum up, our framework highlights three potential mediators linking labour market dis-
advantage to vote choice. The important message is that these causal chains should be mod-
elled explicitly to avoid erroneous inferences. However, we do not see an a priori reason to
prioritise any of the three channels. We are even agnostic as to whether a general theory is
possible or helpful here; our hunch is that the question which mediator dominates strongly
depends on individual and political context.3 We think that our framework will be most pro-
ductive if it is translated into concrete hypotheses for the cases and research questions at hand.
This is what we do in the following section for the Dutch case.
4. The Dutch labour market and party system
The Netherlands is a typical example of a dual labour market. Dismissal protection for
workers with open-ended employment contracts is relatively strict (Eichhorst and Marx,
2012), which has contributed to an increased use of temporary contracts since the 1980s, a
trend various governments have done little to counter (Emmenegger, 2014). In 2012, the
Netherlands had the fourth largest share of temporary contracts in the EU—almost 20% of
the dependent workforce (EUROSTAT, 2014). Part-time employment is very common in the
Netherlands (with 50% the highest incidence in the EU). However, with less than 10% (of all
part-timers) in 2012, it had one of the lowest shares of involuntary part-time (EUROSTAT,
2014). This arguably reﬂects the beneﬁcial treatment by the welfare state and high social ac-
ceptance of this type of work (Visser, 2002). Although the Netherlands has a statutory
minimum wage, the incidence of low-wage employment as well as wage dispersion in the
lower half of the earnings distribution is comparatively large. This reﬂects a continuous
decline of the minimum wage relative to median earnings (Salverda and Mayhew, 2009).
Whereas non-standard employment is relatively high, the Netherlands had a well below
average unemployment rate throughout the 2000s and during the recent economic crisis.
The unemployment rate in 2012 was 5.3% (EUROSTAT, 2014).
In a comparative perspective, the Dutch party system provides an interesting context to
assess the voting behaviour of individuals with labour market disadvantages because it
offers them a wide choice of different ideological positions. Since the general elections in
2012, 11 parties are represented in Parliament. Parties at the margins of the ideological spec-
trum performed relatively well. The right-wing populist Freedom Party (PVV) and the
left-wing populist Socialist Party (SP) are the third and fourth strongest parties, respectively
(see Figure 1). However, these parties have never been part of a governing coalition. We
expect the presence of polarising parties to increase turnout amongst voters who are alienated
3 We have already pointed to the important role of the party system. It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss individual variation amongst the disadvantaged, although we see it as an important and
logical next step in the debate.
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from mainstream politics. In a comparative perspective, this stacks the cards against ﬁnding
increased abstention amongst individuals with labour market disadvantages.
According to Lindvall and Rueda (2014), the behaviour of the major left party is crucial
for the electoral choice of the disadvantaged. Under the leadership of Wim Kok in the 1990s,
the Dutch Labour Party (PvdA) developed a rather centrist policy orientation. This is ex-
pressed in openness to coalitions with the Liberal Party (VVD) and measures of welfare
state retrenchment (Green-Pedersen and van Kersbergen, 2002; Marx and Schumacher,
2013). We would therefore expect that the Labour Party is rather unpopular amongst indivi-
duals with labour market disadvantages.
Figure 2 plots the Dutch parties’ general left-right position against their position on redis-
tribution.4 Unsurprisingly, the two dimensions are closely aligned. A partial exception is the
right-wing populist PVV, which given its extreme right position has a relatively moderate
stance on redistribution. The fact that voting PVV allows expressing discontent with main-
stream parties without supporting an anti-redistribution agenda could make the party attract-
ive for individuals with labour market disadvantages.
In sum, translating our hypotheses into the context of the Dutch party system leads us to
formulate the following four expectations. First, following the redistribution hypothesis, we
Figure 2 Left-right position and position on redistribution in the Dutch party system (2010).
Notes: No data available for the party 50+. Numbers in parentheses refer to seat share after 2012
election.
Source: Chapel Hill expert survey 2010 (Bakker et al., 2014).
4 Figure 1 is based on data from the Chapel Hill expert survey released in 2010. The Chapel Hill expert
survey locates parties of European countries on several important ideological and policy dimensions.
Multiple academic experts are asked to locate their respective national parties on these dimensions.
The parties’ ﬁnal score for each dimension is derived by averaging the single expert scores (see
Bakker et al., 2014).
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expect a positive relationship between labour market disadvantage and electoral support for
the Socialists, Labour and the Greens. Second, following the internal efﬁcacy hypothesis, we
expect labour market disadvantage to lead to increased abstention from voting. Third, follow-
ing the external efﬁcacy hypothesis, we expect labour market disadvantage to be positively
associated with either increased support for the Socialists and the Freedom Party or abstention
from voting. However, redistributive goals and the desire to cast a protest vote collide to a
certain extent in the case of the Freedom Party, whereas they reinforce each other in the
case of the Socialists. Hence, we expect that the Socialists are the only party that individuals
with labour market disadvantages can endorse unambiguously if the twin effect of redistribu-
tion preferences and external efﬁcacy is at work.
5. Data and operationalisation
For our empirical analysis, we make use of household panel data from the Dutch LISS
(Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences) database provided by CentERdata.
This panel study started at the end of 2007 and consists of around 5000 Dutch households
comprising 8000 individuals. Hence we are able to draw on ﬁve waves from 2008 to 2012.
We focus only on the potential working population between the age of 18 and 65 years, and
we exclude pensioners and students. The LISS data set is particularly suitable for our purpose
because the core questionnaires include many useful items on employment status and political
orientations. The internet-based survey format also delivers good response rates. Furthermore,
the LISS includes a post-election survey conducted with the panel participants after the 2012
election, which we use to operationalise our dependent variable.
We exploit the data set’s longitudinal information to create a more informative measure of
labour market disadvantage, which is then used in a cross-sectional analysis of voting behav-
iour (2012 post-election survey). We dismiss the alternative of analysing within-case variation
because our dependent variable, electoral behaviour, is not available on a yearly basis.
In addition, many variables in our analysis can be expected to be very resilient over time.
The propensity to participate and underlying political orientations are often found to be rather
stable and only affected by signiﬁcant disruptive experiences (Plutzer, 2002; Prior, 2010).
Hence, it is reasonable to assume that adverse labour market experiences need to accumulate
over a long time period to lead to meaningful adjustments in individuals’ beliefs about politics
and associated behaviours. Our short ﬁve-year panel without yearly variation on the main
variables is not a good ﬁt for ﬁxed-effects regressions. Yet we can use the longitudinal infor-
mation to create a more valid measure of labour market disadvantage. The strength of our
indicator, which we present below, is that it can distinguish between persistent and transient
experiences of labour market disadvantage.
Our concept of labour market disadvantage builds on the four dimensions that are prom-
inent in the comparative literature, particularly the insider-outsider and dualisation literature
(Rueda, 2005; Emmenegger, 2009; Häusermann and Schwander, 2012; Marx and Picot,
2013): unemployment, involuntary part-time work, temporary employment and low-wage
work. In the empirical analysis, we treat these four dimensions as comparable instances of
labour market disadvantage because, as we have theoretically argued, every dimension
results in a high degree of personal economic strain and because we expect people to repeat-
edly move between these different forms of disadvantage. This expectation is borne out by the
data. For instance, in the ﬁve-year interval that we can observe with the LISS data, 36% of all
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respondents who have experienced temporary employment also experienced involuntary part-
time work, 40% experienced low-wage work and 22% also experienced unemployment. In
addition, we analysed these four dimensions separately. As the results provided in the
Supplementary Material Appendix show, we observe the same relationships in the case of
the four individual dimensions as we do in the case of the composite indicator.
Our composite indicator is based on four dichotomous sub-indicators. One of the four di-
mensions (temporary employment) is by deﬁnition dichotomous. Also unemployment and in-
voluntary part-time employment are usually conceptualised and measured as discrete states.
To allow for a straightforward aggregation, we also dichotomise the wage variable. Although
this implies a certain loss of information, it is warranted by the non-linear nature of the effect
we theorise.5
Our measure of unemployment is based on a monthly background measure of respon-
dents’ employment state. We code a person as having experienced unemployment if we
observe at least four or more months of unemployment per year. Shorter unemployment
spells (three months or less) are not considered because they might simply reﬂect frictional
unemployment.
Our measure of involuntary part-time work captures workers who do not have a full-time
job but would like to work more hours. Hence, we only consider workers whowork part-time
because they are not able to ﬁnd a job with more hours. We code respondents as involuntary
part-time workers if they work 36 hours or less and have a working hour aspiration that
exceeds the actual working time by at least 5 hours to restrict our focus to workers who are
clearly under-employed and therefore suffer from substantial socio-economic consequences.
Temporary employment is measured by a dummy coded 1 if respondents indicate that they
are temporarily employed, on-call employed or a temp staffer.
Low-wage employment is measured on the basis of the hourly wages respondents earn. As
information on hourly wages are not provided directly in the data, we calculate them from
data on gross monthly income and weekly working hours. Therefore, this measure does not
interfere with our deﬁnition of involuntary part-timework. The low-wage threshold is deﬁned
as two-thirds of the median hourly gross wage. This corresponds to the deﬁnition of the
low-wage sector used by the OECD (2012). The median hourly wage in our data is €16.17.
We therefore set the low-wage threshold to €10.78.
Our conceptualisation of labour market disadvantage takes into account these four differ-
ent forms of disadvantage over time. Deﬁning labour market disadvantage statically with
5 In principle, we could operationalise involuntary part-time employment (the difference between
desired and actual working time), unemployment duration and wages continuously. However, in
each case, the exact functional form is theoretically not known. Hence, the most straightforward
way to operationalise involuntary part-time employment, unemployment and wages is to use a
series of dummy variables to differentiate levels of under-employment, wage brackets and unemploy-
ment duration. However, since we are only interested in whether the respondents experienced sub-
stantial involuntary under-employment, low-wage work or prolonged unemployment, respectively,
single dummy variables are sufﬁcient. Moreover, having dichotomous indicators on all four dimensions
allows us to use a straightforward discounting procedure, explained later, to integrate information on
negative labour market experiences from previous years in our cross-sectional model. Hence, whilst
the dichotomisation implies a certain loss of information in the cross section, it allows for the consid-
eration of information about previous labour market experiences.
Labour market disadvantage, political orientations and voting 199
cross-sectional data can be problematic because it is likely that past experiences continue to
have an effect. Accordingly, a labour market participant in t1 with no previous experience of
unemployment could behave very differently than another labour market participant in t1
who was unemployed in t0. Therefore, our approach is to use the longitudinal information
to account for the labour market experiences respondents have had during the whole ﬁve-year
period.
We use our four dimensions to create an index of labour market disadvantage that takes
the value of 1 if at least one of the four disadvantages was experienced in a given year and 0
otherwise. We think it is reasonable to assume that the effects of labour market experiences do
not immediately disappear from a person’s mind on a yearly basis. At the same time, it is un-
likely that past experiences have the same weight as contemporary ones. As time passes, mem-
ories of past labour market experiences fade from people’s minds. Both effects can be taken
into account by using a discounting procedure. We carry over experiences from one year into
the next but use a discounting factor to model the fading relevance of previous experiences.
We implement this idea with the following simple operation:
Disadvantagediscounted ¼ Xt þXt1δ þXt2δ2    þXtnδn
whereX is a dummy variable measuring labour market disadvantage for a person in each year
and δ is the discounting factor (see the Supplementary Material Appendix for an illustrative
example of the discounting procedure). We use a discounting factor of 0.7, which allows an
experience to lose 50% of its relevance in two years but remain substantial for a considerable
time period. However, the empirical results presented in the subsequent analysis are robust to
changes of the discounting factor to 0.8 (relevance reduced by 36% over two years) and 0.6
(relevance reduced by 64% over two years). Figure 3 displays the values of our discounted
disadvantage index.
With regards to the other variables of interest, we capture preferences for redistribution
using a survey item measuring respondents’ opinion on whether income differences should
decrease or increase. The variable ranges from ‘differences should increase’ (1) to ‘differences
should decrease’ (5). Admittedly, this variable is not optimal because it does not involve any
discussion of the role of government in shaping income differences. However, for reasons of
data availability, we have to work with this operationalisation.
To measure external efﬁcacy we rely on respondents’ conﬁdence in and satisfaction with
political institutions. These measures are good approximations of individuals’ attitudes
towards elite responsiveness and the general functioning of the political system. Previous re-
search has shown that these indicators strongly correlate with various measures of political
trust and external efﬁcacy (Craig et al., 1990). We use the LISS data’s measures of conﬁdence
in and satisfaction with political actors to conduct a conﬁrmatory factor analysis (CFA)
helping us construct a measure of external efﬁcacy. We predict a latent variable with measures
on conﬁdence in and satisfaction with political parties, politicians and the parliament (based
on six Likert scales ranging from 0 to 10). After accounting for the covariance between the
items, we receive a very good model ﬁt conﬁrming that the six items capture a single latent
construct.6
6 The chi-square test is insigniﬁcant indicating a nearly perfect ﬁt. We receive an RMSEA clearly below
0.05. The SRMR is far below 0.08. See Table A2 in the Supplementary Material Appendix for a complete
report of the results of the CFA.
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The post-election survey includes three survey items tapping respondents’ internal efﬁcacy.
On a four-point Likert scale ranging from ‘fully agree’ to ‘fully disagree,’ respondents were
asked to rate the statements: (1) ‘I feel well qualiﬁed to play an active role in politics;’ (2) ‘I
have a good understanding of the most important political problems in our country;’ (3)
‘Sometimes politics seems so complicated that people like me cannot really understand it.’
CFA of the three items produces a good model ﬁt, conﬁrming that they capture a common
latent construct.7
Turning to our dependent variables, we are interested in three types of voting behaviour.
First, we hypothesise that disadvantage is mediated by external efﬁcacy and leads to an in-
creased likelihood of protest voting. Hence, we create a dummy variable called ‘protest’
which is 1 if a respondent voted SP, PVV or abstained in the 2012 parliamentary elections.
Second, we hypothesise that disadvantage is mediated by internal efﬁcacy and reduces the like-
lihood to turnout. This is measured by a dummy indicating 1 if a respondent abstained from
the election. Third, we hypothesise that disadvantage is mediated by respondents’ preferences
for redistribution, leading to an increased probability to vote for pro-redistribution parties.
Accordingly, we create a dummy measuring if a respondent voted PvdA, SP or Greens. As a
robustness check we also break up these dummies and analyse the effect of labour market dis-
advantage on voting for single parties.
Figure 3 Histogram of discounted disadvantage index (δ = 0.7).
Notes: Own calculations based on LISS data set.
7 The chi-square test is insigniﬁcant, indicating a nearly perfect ﬁt. We receive an RMSEA clearly below
0.05. The SRMR is far below 0.08. See Table A3 in the Supplementary Materials Appendix for a com-
plete report of the results of the CFA.
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We control for gender, age and education. Moreover, we include a dummy for respondents
who willingly do not participate in the labour market (non-participants).8 Hence, our refer-
ence group in the subsequent analysis are individuals who have not experienced any disadvan-
tages and did not indicate any reasons they do not participate in the labour market. Further
control variables are union membership and household income. Union members are expected
to favour redistribution and be more likely to vote for left parties.Moreover, since unionmem-
bership is a form of social participation, unionmembers may have higher levels of internal and
external efﬁcacy. Resource endowment is another important determinant of political behav-
iour. To control for household effects we include dummy variables indicating the position of a
respondent in the household. We rely on information on whether the respondent indicates
being the main contributor to the household income. Our dummy variable captures respon-
dents who provide the main income and have someone who relies on them (a spouse and/or
children). The main carer dummy variable captures respondents who indicated that they are
wedded to someone who provides the main income.
The following empirical part uses a mediation analysis to investigate through which paths
labour market disadvantage affects vote choice. The central goal of such a mediation analysis
is the identiﬁcation of causal mechanisms proposed by theoretical arguments (Imai et al.,
2010, 2011). On a basic level, mediation analysis tells us whether part of an independent vari-
able’s effect (treatment variable) on the dependent variable is translated via another variable
(mediator variable). Hence, we are interested in the part of the variance the treatment variable
(labour market disadvantage) explains of the mediator variable (external efﬁcacy, internal ef-
ﬁcacy and redistribution preferences) and howmuch of that part is translated into a signiﬁcant
effect of the mediator variable on voting behaviour.
6. Analysis
We begin our analysis by investigating the direct effect of the three mediator variables on vote
choice. We estimate a multinomial logit regression with our mediators as predictors (see
Table A4 in the SupplementaryMaterial Appendix). As expected, strong preferences for redis-
tribution signiﬁcantly increase the probability to vote for PvdA, SP or Greens, whilst the effect
on the VVD is signiﬁcant and negative. High external efﬁcacy signiﬁcantly decreases the like-
lihood of voting for left or protest parties (PvdA, PVV and SP). Moreover, high external efﬁ-
cacy decreases the probability of abstaining from the election. Also high internal efﬁcacy
signiﬁcantly decreases the probability of abstention. These ﬁndings conﬁrm that our mediator
variables have the expected effects.
In a next step we investigate the direct effect of our disadvantage indicator on vote choice.
Table 1 presents two multinomial logit regressions with the party D66 as base outcome (D66
is the most centrist party according to the Chapel Hill left-right measure). Panel A of Table 1
shows that experiencing labour market disadvantage signiﬁcantly increases the probability of
voting SP. Several mechanisms could explain this ﬁnding. Disadvantage could work through
economic self-interest and increase the preferences for redistribution, which leads to a vote for
the pro-redistribution party SP. Alternatively, disadvantage could decrease respondents’ exter-
nal efﬁcacy and lead to an SP vote in form of a protest vote. Indeed, the fact that we observe a
8 These are respondents who indicated that they have a reason to not participate in the labour market,
such as childcare, disabilities and health issues.
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Table 1 Multinomial estimates of vote choice
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Abstention VVD PvdA PVV SP CDA D66 ChristenUn Greens
Panel A
Disadvantage index 0.139 0.00307 0.0890 0.113 0.237** 0.0503 Base outcome −0.0492 0.108
(0.107) (0.0991) (0.100) (0.122) (0.109) (0.131) (0.172) (0.163)
Constant 6.048*** 3.265*** 1.988*** 4.921*** 2.914*** −0.249 1.731** −1.795**
(0.589) (0.526) (0.557) (0.687) (0.624) (0.711) (0.805) (0.842)
Observations 2827 2827 2827 2827 2827 2827 2827 2827 2827
Panel B
Disadvantage index 0.0415 0.000242 0.0499 0.0154 0.192 0.0307 Base outcome −0.0685 0.189
(0.134) (0.119) (0.118) (0.144) (0.127) (0.148) (0.202) (0.173)
Redistribution 0.00434 −0.640*** 0.490*** −0.0600 0.534*** −0.0535 −0.0507 0.848***
(0.123) (0.102) (0.105) (0.140) (0.124) (0.134) (0.157) (0.187)
External efﬁcacy −0.748*** 0.0224 −0.257** −0.921*** −0.534*** 0.260 −0.102 −0.00822
(0.129) (0.126) (0.121) (0.137) (0.127) (0.177) (0.196) (0.175)
Internal efﬁcacy −0.588*** −0.149 0.0451 0.0244 −0.113 −0.276 0.0399 0.248
(0.165) (0.147) (0.143) (0.176) (0.160) (0.201) (0.242) (0.213)
Constant 4.538*** 5.390*** −0.126 4.749*** 0.285 −0.825 2.649*** −5.701***
(0.841) (0.685) (0.758) (0.996) (0.895) (0.941) (0.994) (1.333)
Observations 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147 2147
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. SGP, Animal, 50 plus omitted for purpose of readability. Complete set of control variables included.
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direct effect of disadvantage only for the SP could be due to the hypothesised simultaneous
existence of the two mechanisms. In a similar vein, the non-ﬁndings for the other categories,
such as abstention, could be the result of mediation effects cancelling each other out. Panel B of
Table 1 further demonstrates the importance of mediation effects. Adding the three mediator
variables to the model causes the effect of disadvantage on voting SP to turn insigniﬁcant.
Next we conduct a mediation analysis with the goal of investigating the indirect effect of
labour market disadvantage on vote choice. Recent developments in mediation analysis
provide us with an easy-to-implement strategy to estimate mediation effects for binary
outcome models.9 We employ the method proposed by Imai et al. (2010) because its
simulation-based algorithm accommodates a broad range of statistical frameworks and pro-
vides average mediation effects with conﬁdence intervals. Its logic is based on an experimental
framework, but the method can just as well be used for observational data (Imai et al., 2011).
The mediation effect we are interested in results from the differences in the outcome if we
estimate our dependent variable with the mediator (1) under the condition of having estimated
our mediator with the independent variable of interest and (2) under the condition of omitting
our independent variable of interest from the estimation of the mediator (Imai et al., 2010,
p. 311). The estimation of this difference in outcome is the average (indirect) treatment
effect we are interested in. This estimation strategy ﬁts two separate models: one for the
mediator variable and one for the observed outcome. First, we estimate the mediator vari-
able with our treatment variable (the labour market disadvantage index) plus controls.
Subsequently, we estimate the outcome with our mediator, the treatment and controls.
From the two models, the model parameters are simulated from their sampling distribution.
Based on the simulated potential values of the mediator and the resulting simulated outcome
values, we can estimate the average direct and indirect effects of the main independent (treat-
ment) variable (Hicks and Tingley, 2011).
Table 2 presents the regressions the mediation analysis is based on. Models 5 to 7 use or-
dinary least squares (OLS) to estimate the effect of labour market disadvantage on the three
mediators (ﬁrst step of the mediation analysis). We see that labour market disadvantage sig-
niﬁcantly reduces external efﬁcacy and increases preferences for redistribution. Yet the coef-
ﬁcient for internal efﬁcacy is only signiﬁcant at the 10% level and points into the wrong
direction. Therefore, labour market disadvantage does not seem to affect respondents’ level
of internal efﬁcacy.
Models 1 to 4 estimate types of voting behaviour using probit regressions, including the
three mediator variables (second step of the mediation analysis). Labour market disadvantage
does not seem to have a direct effect on any of the outcome variables. Yet we see that external
efﬁcacy negatively affects protest voting and abstention, but has no signiﬁcant effect on redis-
tribution voting. Redistribution has a signiﬁcant positive impact on redistribution voting and
protest voting but not on abstention. Internal efﬁcacy signiﬁcantly affects all four outcomes.
Whilst there is a negative effect on protest voting and abstention, internal efﬁcacy seems to
increase the probability of a redistribution vote. Hence, the mediator variables affect the
voting dummies as expected, although there are a series of effects that we did not anticipate.
Yet the central question is whether some of the effects of disadvantage on the mediators are
translated into voting behaviour.
9 Conducting a simple Sobel test with a non-linear multinomial logit model is not possible. Solutions for
non-linear models only allow for binary dependent variables (Hayes and Preacher, 2010).
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Table 2 Mediation analysis
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Protest vote Protest vote (without SP) Redistribution vote Abstention External efﬁcacy Redistribution Internal efﬁcacy
Disadvantage index 0.0513 0.011 0.0323 0.0024 −0.1552*** 0.1134*** 0.0267*
(0.0332) (0.0369) (0.0317) (0.0423) (0.0406) (0.0211) (0.016)
External efﬁcacy −0.1678*** −0.1529*** −0.0135 −0.1047***
(0.0172) (0.0186) (0.0166) (0.0208)
Redistribution 0.1064*** −0.0316 0.3628*** −0.0063
(0.0317) (0.0354) (0.0316) (0.0406)
Internal efﬁcacy −0.1665*** −0.2128*** 0.0912*** −0.3348***
(0.0415) (0.0462) (0.0393) (0.0536)
Gender −0.115 −0.2081** 0.0651 −0.1296 −0.0149 0.1194*** −0.3187***
(0.0717) (0.0809) (0.0693) (0.0924) (0.0834) (0.0455) (0.0334)
Age −0.0983*** −0.1441*** 0.1222*** −0.1379*** −0.0361 0.0725*** 0.0905***
(0.0272) (0.0299) (0.0265) (0.0338) (0.0298) (0.0172) (0.0131)
Education −0.0272*** −0.0440*** 0.0257*** −0.0283*** 0.0438*** −0.0131*** 0.0324***
(0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0052) (0.0069) (0.0060) (0.0034) (0.0025)
Non-participants 0.0081 −0.0801 0.1239* −0.0709 0.0119 0.0771 0.0067
(0.0746) (0.0852) (0.0721) (0.0954) (0.0900) (0.0496) (0.0355)
Union member 0.1265* −0.0422 0.3133*** −0.0507 −0.1523* 0.3066*** −0.0019
(0.0722) (0.0831) (0.0675) (0.0948) (0.0849) (0.0434) (0.0347)
Migrant background −0.0302 −0.1276 0.1530** 0.1094 −0.1903* −0.0442 −0.0677
(0.0862) (0.0995) (0.0817) (0.1092) (0.1046) (0.0602) (0.0427)
HH income −0.081*** −0.052*** −0.047*** 0.400* 0.098*** −0.073*** 0.037***
(0.016) (0.018) (0.013) (0.221) (0.017) (0.010) (0.006)
Continued
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Table 2 Continued
Probit OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Protest vote Protest vote (without SP) Redistribution vote Abstention External efﬁcacy Redistribution Internal efﬁcacy
Main income earner 0.1387* 0.1682* −0.0421* 0.0864 −0.1558* −0.0516 −0.0752**
(0.0759) (0.0864) (0.0717) (0.0965) (0.0899) (0.0488) (0.0356)
Main carer 0.1163 0.1689* −0.026* 0.0105 −0.0150 −0.0540 −0.1906***
(0.080) (0.0901) (0.0772) (0.103) (0.0935) (0.0512) (0.0392)
Constant 0.1144 0.7184 −2.8028 0.0642 −0. 667*** 3.8645*** −0.8211
(0.2193) (0.2420) (0.2193) (0.2721) (0.199) (0.1157) (0.0849)
R² 0.07 0.10 0.17
Pseudo R² 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09
Observations 2557 2557 2557 2557 2557 2557 2557
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0.1. HH income multiplied by 1000.
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Table 3 presents the average mediation (indirect effect) and the average direct effect of
labour market disadvantage on protest voting. We can see that there is a signiﬁcant indirect
effect of disadvantage on protest voting via external efﬁcacy and redistribution, but no effect
for internal efﬁcacy. The coefﬁcient for external efﬁcacy is the biggest and the reported per-
centage of the effect being mediated is 32% for external efﬁcacy and only 18% for redistribu-
tion, which shows that the dominant mediator for protest voting is external efﬁcacy.
Experiencing labour market disadvantages seems to reduce external efﬁcacy, which in turn
leads to an increased probability of voting for extreme parties or abstain from the election.
The signiﬁcant indirect effect on protest voting through redistribution in Table 3 could be
due to the SP votes, which are also included in the protest vote dummy. To test for this pos-
sibility Model 2 in Table 2 excludes SP votes from the dependent variable (protest voting).
Table 4 presents the resulting mediation effects and conﬁrms that the indirect effect via redis-
tribution is solely the result of the SP votes being included in the outcome of Model
1. Excluding SP votes results in the average mediation via redistribution turning insigniﬁcant.
Put differently, whilst low external efﬁcacy signiﬁcantly increases the probability of a protest
vote or abstention, redistribution preferences only affect the likelihood of voting for the SP.
According to our hypotheses, redistribution preferences should also mediate the effect of
disadvantage on other pro-redistribution parties such as the PvdA and the Greens. Table 5
presents the results of the mediation analysis based on Model 3 from Table 2. In line with
our expectations, labourmarket disadvantage has a signiﬁcant indirect effect on redistribution
voting through respondents’ preferences for redistribution. Put differently, negative labour
market experiences tend to increase preferences for redistribution, which in turn result in a
higher probability to vote for pro-redistribution parties such as the PvdA, the SP and the
Greens.
Finally, we have hypothesised internal efﬁcacy to mediate the negative effect of labour
market disadvantage on abstention. However, as mentioned, labour market disadvantage
does not have the expected effect on internal efﬁcacy (seeModel 7 in Table 2). Hence, internal
efﬁcacy should not have any observable mediation effect. Table 6 displays the results of our
mediation analysis for the outcome abstention. It shows that the effect of disadvantage on ab-
stention is exclusively mediated by external efﬁcacy.
Table 3 Simulated direct and indirect effects of labour market disadvantage on protest voting
Effect Mean 95% conﬁdence interval
Via external efﬁcacy
Average mediation 0.008** 0.004 0.012
Average direct effect 0.015 −0.003 0.035
Via redistribution
Average mediation 0.003** 0.001 0.006
Average direct effect 0.015 −0.003 0.035
Via internal efﬁcacy
Average mediation −0.001 −0.003 0.0002
Average direct effect 0.015 −0.003 0.035
Notes: **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
Labour market disadvantage, political orientations and voting 207
In sum, the mediation analysis reveals two important ﬁndings. First, labour market disad-
vantage increases the probability of voting for radical parties or to abstain from the election.
This relationship is mediated by the respondents’ level of external efﬁcacy. Second, labour
market disadvantage increases the probability of voting for pro-redistribution parties. This
effect is mediated by the respondents’ preferences for redistribution. In contrast, labour
market disadvantage has no effect on internal efﬁcacy. Thus, even though being a strong pre-
dictor of voting behaviour in general, internal efﬁcacy does not mediate the effect of labour
market disadvantage on political behaviour.
Regarding the robustness of these ﬁndings, readers might be concerned about the fact that
we have combined votes for different parties into dummies. Therefore, we have conducted me-
diation analyses for single party votes. As the mediation analysis for voting for individual
parties shows (see Tables A5–A10 in the Supplementary Material Appendix), our ﬁndings
hold: the effect of disadvantage on abstention and voting for the PVV is exclusively mediated
by external efﬁcacy. Voting PvdA is exclusively mediated by preferences for redistribution. Both
mediators inﬂuence the propensity to vote for the SP. In contrast, we ﬁnd that the mediation
effects cancel each other out in the case of the Greens. Here, disadvantage exerts a positive
effect via redistribution, whilst simultaneously impacting negatively via external efﬁcacy.10
Table 4 Simulated direct and indirect effects of labour market disadvantage on protest voting
(without SP vote)
Effect Mean 95% conﬁdence interval
Via external efﬁcacy
Average mediation 0.005** 0.002 0.008
Average direct effect 0.002 −0.013 0.019
Via redistribution
Average mediation −0.001 −0.003 0.001
Average direct effect 0.002 −0.013 0.019
Notes: **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
Table 5 Simulated direct and indirect effects of labourmarket disadvantage on redistribution vote
Effect Mean 95% conﬁdence interval
Via external efﬁcacy
Average mediation 0.001 −0.001 0.002
Average direct Effect 0.011 −0.009 0.031
Via redistribution
Average mediation 0.013** 0.008 0.019
Average direct effect 0.011 −0.009 0.031
Notes: **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
10 In the Supplementary Material Appendix we also provide a sensitivity test of the mediation relation
proposed by Imai et al. (2010).
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Moreover, as we have highlighted, our results are robust if we disaggregate our combined
disadvantage measure into the four single dimensions (unemployment, low-wage work, invol-
untary part-time and temporary work). Tables A11 to A17 in the Supplementary Material
Appendix show that the signiﬁcant effects on protest vote via external efﬁcacy and on redistri-
bution vote via redistribution preferences hold for all four sub-dimensions.
7. Conclusion
With this article we advance the literature linking labour market experiences and political be-
haviour. Whilst they have often been analysed separately, we argue and show that psycho-
logical and instrumental mechanisms coexist. Accordingly, we have found empirical
evidence that labour market experiences are mediated by both preferences for redistribution
as well as external efﬁcacy. This supports our initial presumption that these separate research
strands on the labour market’s effects on political behaviour can and should be combined. The
co-existing mechanisms can amplify a relationship, such as their joint effect on the propensity
to vote SP, but they can also cancel each other out, as in the case of the Greens.
We did not ﬁnd an effect of disadvantage on internal efﬁcacy and therefore also no
mediated effect on political behaviour. This is an interesting ﬁnding in its own right. It suggests
that labourmarket disadvantage is mediated by adverse feelings about the political system, not
by subjective political competence. A possible reason underlying the non-ﬁnding is that a sense
of internal efﬁcacy becomes resilient to change once basic political socialisation is complete.
This would diminish the effect of disadvantage later in life. Future research should assess the
role of labour market experiences at different life cycle stages. The positive ﬁnding for external
efﬁcacy corroborates insider-outsider and dualisation arguments, which suggest that political
behaviour is not the automatic outcome of labour market disadvantage. We support the view
that behaviour of political elites and representation of interests of disadvantaged workers
matter.
This links to the question of whether our results are generalisable. This article’s intention
was to advance a general framework for studying political behaviour of disadvantaged
workers. We are conﬁdent that it will serve as a useful heuristic device to develop hypotheses
about political effects of labour market experiences in very different contexts. But we are well
aware that our empirical ﬁndings are context-dependent to some extent. Whilst we expect
similar effects in many other advanced industrial democracies, this would have to be demon-
strated empirically.
Table 6 Simulated direct and indirect effects of labour market disadvantage on vote abstention
Effect Mean 95% conﬁdence interval
Via external efﬁcacy
Average mediation 0.003** 0.001 0.005
Average direct effect 0.0005 −0.014 0.015
Via internal efﬁcacy
Average mediation −0.002 −0.004 0.0002
Average direct effect 0.0005 −0.014 0.015
Notes: **P < 0.05, *P < 0.10.
Labour market disadvantage, political orientations and voting 209
Three factors are likely to matter in a comparative perspective: party systems, party behav-
iour as well as welfare state and labour market context. For instance, disadvantage and low
external efﬁcacy did not foster abstention in the Netherlands, but they might do so in a two-
party system where no party voices anger about the establishment. As the ﬁndings by Lindvall
and Rueda (2014) indicate, strategies of major left parties can inﬂuence whether voters feel
alienated from mainstream parties. In some countries, it could be that welfare chauvinistic
right-wing parties beneﬁt from redistribution demand and low external efﬁcacy of disadvan-
taged workers. Finally, it might be that we have under-estimated the effect of disadvantage on
internal efﬁcacy, because we have chosen a country with sound labour market performance
and generous unemployment beneﬁts.
These limitations notwithstanding, our results carry important messages for the discussed
debates. We show that the political behaviour literature would be well advised to pay more
attention to different forms of labour market disadvantage as well as to the mediating role
of external efﬁcacy (as opposed to the currently dominant perspectives on resources and
civic skills). Political economists should make greater efforts to go beyond structuralist reason-
ing when theorising effects on political behaviour and speciﬁcally include the possibility of
political alienation in their models.
We regard this research as preliminary evidence on the potential role of psychological and
instrumental mechanisms. Further research will be needed to investigate the functioning of the
different mechanisms and their interplay. This will require comparative evidence, but it will
also require opening up the black boxes with regard to the underlying causal models.
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